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应用生态学报 ›› 2022, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (12): 3195-3204.doi: 10.13287/j.1001-9332.202212.020

• 产业生态学与社会生态系统管理专栏 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于演化博弈视角的环境正义下重工业区工业碳排放治理机制

王越*, 曾先   

  1. 沈阳师范大学管理学院, 沈阳 110034
  • 收稿日期:2022-04-10 接受日期:2022-09-14 出版日期:2022-12-15 发布日期:2023-07-05
  • 通讯作者: * E-mail: ywmath@163.com
  • 作者简介:王越, 女, 1988年生, 博士。主要从事土地利用与管理研究。E-mail: ywmath@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(41971166)、辽宁省经济社会发展研究项目(2023lslqnkt-062,2022lslwtkt-056)、辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L19BGL013)和辽宁省教育厅科学研究项目(WJC201902)

Governance mechanisms of industrial carbon emissions in heavy industrial zones under environmental justice based on evolutionary game perspective

WANG Yue*, ZENG Xian   

  1. School of Management, Shenyang Normal University, Shenyang 110034, China
  • Received:2022-04-10 Accepted:2022-09-14 Online:2022-12-15 Published:2023-07-05

摘要: 探寻生态文明建设背景下重工业区工业碳排放治理机制,对于实现“双碳”目标和环境正义具有重要意义。本研究以辽宁重工业区为例,构建地方政府、工业企业和第三方核查机构三方演化博弈模型,探讨影响工业碳排放策略选择的关键因素,对不同均衡点下三方利益主体的策略选择进行仿真,进而构建工业碳排放治理机制。结果表明: 不同均衡情景下,研究区工业碳排放利益主体策略选择分别符合现实和理想两种情景。在三方利益主体博弈的不同均衡情景中,地方政府和第三方核查机构在不同稳定性均衡情景碳排放策略选择中分别起主导作用。政策补贴、违规行为罚款、减排成本、核查成本和监管成本是研究区工业碳排放三方利益主体演化博弈的关键影响因素。结合工业碳排放的关键影响因素,从创新机制、约束机制、市场机制和倒逼机制4个方面构建研究区工业碳排放治理机制。完善研究区工业碳排放利益均衡分配,促进三方利益主体合作,可实现工业碳排放利益主体博弈下的环境正义。

关键词: 工业碳排放, 环境正义, 治理机制, 演化博弈

Abstract: Exploring the governance mechanisms of industrial carbon emissions in heavy industrial zones under the background of ecological civilization construction is of great significance to achieve the goal of ‘double carbon' and environmental justice. With Liaoning heavy industrial zones as an example, we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, industrial enterprises and third-party verification institutions. We examined the key factors affecting the strategic choice of industrial carbon emission tripartite stakeholders. The strategic choices of three stakeholders under different equilibrium points were simulated, and the industrial carbon emission governance mechanisms were constructed. The results showed that the stakeholder strategy choices of industrial carbon emissions under different equilibrium circumstances in the study area were in line with the reality and ideal respectively. In different equilibrium situations of tripartite stakeholder game, local governments, and third-party verification institutions played a leading role in the strategic choices of carbon emissions in different stable equilibrium circumstances. Policy subsidies, fines for violations, emission reduction costs, verification costs and regulatory costs were the key factors influencing the evolutionary game among the three stakeholders of industrial carbon emissions in the study area. Combined with the key influencing factors of industrial carbon emissions, the governance mechanisms of industrial carbon emissions in the study area were constructed from four aspects: innovation mechanism, constraint mechanism, market mechanism, and reverse forcing mechanism. Improving the balanced distribution of industrial carbon emission benefits in the study area amd promoting cooperation among the three parties would help realize environmental justice under the game of industrial carbon emission stakeholders.

Key words: industrial carbon emission, environmental justice, governance mechanism, evolutionary game